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Abstract
The impact of payment-for-performance (P4P) schemes in the health sector has been documented,
but there has been little attention to the distributional effects of P4P across health facilities. We
examined the distribution of P4P payouts over time and assessed whether increased service cover-
age due to P4P differed across facilities in Tanzania. We used two service outcomes that improved
due to P4P [facility-based deliveries and provision of antimalarials during antenatal care (ANC)], to
also assess whether incentive design matters for performance inequalities. We used data from 150
facilities from intervention and comparison areas in January 2012 and 13months later. Our primary
data were gathered through facility survey and household survey, while data on performance pay-
outs were obtained from the programme administrator. Descriptive inequality measures were
used to examine the distribution of payouts across facility subgroups. Difference-in-differences re-
gression analyses were used to identify P4P differential effects on the two service coverage out-
comes across facility subgroups. We found that performance payouts were initially higher among
higher-level facilities (hospitals and health centres) compared with dispensaries, among facilities
with more medical commodities and among facilities serving wealthier populations, but these
inequalities declined over time. P4P had greater effects on coverage of institutional deliveries
among facilities with low baseline performance, serving middle wealth populations and located in
rural areas. P4P effects on antimalarials provision during ANC was similar across facilities.
Performance inequalities were influenced by the design of incentives and a range of facility charac-
teristics; however, the nature of the service being targeted is also likely to have affected provider
response. Further research is needed to examine in more detail the effects of incentive design on
outcomes and researchers should be encouraged to report on design aspects in their evaluations
of P4P and systematically monitor and report subgroup effects across providers.
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Introduction
Payment-for-Performance (P4P) programmes, involving financial
incentives (payouts) to healthcare workers and healthcare facility
for achievement of pre-defined performance outcomes, are aimed at
improving the quality of care and, especially in low- and middle-
income countries (LMICs) are aimed to increase service coverage
and strengthen health systems more generally (Meessen et al., 2011;
Witter et al., 2013). The measured effects of P4P on healthcare
coverage and quality are mixed across programmes and settings
(Gillam et al., 2012; Witter et al., 2012; Eijkenaar et al., 2013; Das
et al., 2016; Renmans et al., 2016; Mendelson et al., 2017).
To date, most evaluations of P4P schemes have largely focused
on average programme effects, and paid less attention to how this
remuneration system affect the distribution of programme effects
(Markovitz and Ryan, 2016; Sherry et al., 2017). The heterogeneity
of P4P effects on service use among populations have been docu-
mented in the literature (Alshamsan et al., 2010; Renmans et al.,
2016; Van de Poel et al., 2016; Binyaruka et al., 2018). However,
from a theoretical point of view, it is not clear how P4P will affect
the distribution of performance/performance inequalities across ser-
vice providers. P4P could give the facilities that are lagging behind
extra motivation to catch up and it may be easier to increase per-
formance from a low level (Alshamsan et al., 2010; Meessen et al.,
2011; Fritsche et al., 2014). But P4P could also increase perform-
ance inequalities by rewarding facilities that are better able to per-
form (e.g. better resourced facilities) (Ireland et al., 2011). The
distributional effects of P4P will also depend, for example, on the
exact design of the incentive scheme, and whether the reward de-
pend linearly or non-linearly on performance score (Mehrotra et al.,
2010; Van Herck et al., 2010; Levitt et al., 2012; Eijkenaar, 2013;
Miller and Babiarz, 2013).
In this study, we measured how P4P in Tanzania affected service
coverage and facility performance across facilities with different
characteristics, and whether the design of performance incentives
enhanced or mitigated inequalities in service provision across facili-
ties. This assessment is important especially in LMICs given the sub-
stantial variation in health facility readiness to deliver services
(MoHSW, 2013; O’Neill et al., 2013).
P4P intervention in Tanzania
The public sector dominates the Tanzanian health system, private
for profit and the voluntary sector (faith-based) serve as important
supplements (MoHSW, 2015). The public health system has a hier-
archal administrative structure with three main facility levels of
care: dispensaries, health centres and hospitals. Dispensaries and
health centres provides primary healthcare services, and hospitals
are referral facilities.
In 2011, the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare (MoHSW) in
Tanzania, with support from the Government of Norway, introduced
a P4P pilot scheme in all seven districts of Pwani region. Pwani region
has >300 health facilities covering a population of just over a million
(NBS, 2013). All facilities providing maternal and child health
(MCH) services in Pwani were included in the scheme. The P4P
scheme was introduced to reduce maternal, neonatal and child mor-
bidity and mortality by improving the coverage and quality of MCH
services. It also aimed to inform the national P4P roll out. P4P incen-
tives were tied to coverage of services (e.g. facility-based/institutional
delivery) and content of care targets [e.g. provision of Intermittent
Preventive Treatment (IPT) doses for malaria during antenatal care
(ANC)] (Borghi et al., 2013; Binyaruka et al., 2015). Since P4P aimed
to increase service coverage, performance targets were set based on
coverage rates. For example, facilities were rewarded with extra fund-
ing if facility-based deliveries surpassed a target percentage of all
deliveries, and if the fraction of pregnant women that received at least
two doses of IPT (IPT2) were above a target (Table 1).
There were two methods of target setting (Table 1): a single
threshold (absolute coverage target) and multiple thresholds based on
baseline performance/previous cycle (relative change/overall result).
For multiple thresholds, each group of facilities faced an absolute
threshold based on baseline performance: Group 1 (0–20% coverage
of said indicator), Group 2 (21–40%), Group 3 (41–70%), Group 4
(71–85%) and Group 5 (>85%). Group 5 was required to improve or
maintain coverage for payment. District and regional managers were
rewarded for the performance of facilities in their district or region.
Performance data were compiled by facilities and verified by the
P4P implementing agency every 6 months (one cycle) before pay-
ments. The maximum payout per cycle differed by facility level of
care: USD 820 per cycle for dispensaries; USD 3220 for health centres
and USD 6790 for hospitals. From the total payout earned, the largest
share (90% in hospitals and 75% in lower level facilities) was for staff
bonuses, while the remainder was for facility improvement and to in-
crease demand. P4P payments were additional to regular government
funding for operational costs and salaries unrelated to performance.
Full payment per indicator was made if 100% of a given target was
achieved, 50% of payment was made for 75–99% achievement and
no payment was made for lower levels of performance. Staff bonuses
were almost equivalent to 10% of their monthly salary if all targets
were fully attained. The maximum payout for district and regional
managers was USD 3000 per cycle (Borghi et al., 2013).
An impact evaluation of the P4P programme in Tanzania
showed a significant positive effect on two out of the eight
incentivized service indicators: facility-based delivery rate and provi-
sion of antimalarials during ANC (Binyaruka et al., 2015). The pro-
gramme also increased the availability of drugs and supplies,
increased supportive supervision, reduced payment of user fees and
resulted in greater provider kindness during delivery care
(Binyaruka et al., 2015; Anselmi et al., 2017; Binyaruka and Borghi,
2017; Mayumana et al., 2017).
Conceptual framework
To conceptualise the pathways to distributional effects of P4P
among health providers, we adapted the theoretical framework by
Rittenhouse et al. (2010) and Markovitz and Ryan (2016) to the
Tanzanian context (Figure 1).
In an incentive system like the one implemented in a P4P pilot in
Tanzania, with a hierarchy of performance targets, two factors play
Key messages
• Inequality in payouts favoured better-off facilities, but declined over time.
• Lower baseline performers improved most on institutional deliveries coverage.
• Rural and middle wealth facilities improved most on deliveries coverage.
• Performance on antimalarial provision was similar across facilities.
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a role for how incentives affect the distribution of performance
across facilities; the distance from current performance to the target
and how costly it is for the facility to reach the target level. The costs
of increasing performance depend both on effort costs and on ena-
bling factors.
Suppose performance in period t(pt) is given by facility-level ef-
fort (et), and a set of structural/enabling factors (xt): pt ¼p(et, xt).
Performance is also assumed differentiable and weakly increasing in
both arguments: @p@e  0, @p@x 0. We then consider two types of facili-
ties: those with higher (pH0 ) and lower baseline performance (p
L
0 ). At
baseline we have: D0¼ pH0 – pL0 > 0, and after P4P is introduced we
have D1 ¼ pH1 – pL1 . P4P incentive design structure and/or structural
factors can affect performance across facilities over time, resulting
in convergence in performance/positive distributional effects
(D0 > D1); divergence in performance/negative distributional effects
(D0 < D1); or similar performance across facilities (i.e. zero distri-
butional effects) (D0 ¼ D1). We discuss the extent to which the in-
centive design (P4P target setting) and structural factors (facility-
and area-based characteristics) affect performance across facilities.
Incentive design effect
We considered only target setting approach as potential incentive
design element to affect performance (Figure 1). P4P schemes can re-
ward using fee-for-service, geographical targeting, relative perform-
ance, single absolute threshold targets or multiple threshold targets
(Rosenthal et al., 2005; Rosenthal and Dudley, 2007; Mehrotra
Table 1. Service indicators and performance targets for facilities implementing P4P in Tanzania
P4P service indicators Method Baseline coverage (previous cycle)
0–20% 21–40% 41–70% 71–85% 85%þ
Coverage indicators
% of institutional/facility-based deliveries Percentage point increase 15% 10% 5% 5% Maintain
% of mothers attending a facility within 7 days of delivery. Percentage point increase 15% 10% 5% 5% Maintain
% of women using long term contraceptives Percentage point increase 20% 15% 10% Maintain
above 71%
Maintain
% children under 1 year received measles vaccine Overall result 50% 65% 75% 80%þ Maintain
% children under 1 year received Penta 3 vaccine Overall result 50% 65% 75% 80%þ Maintain
% of complete partographs Overall result 80% 80% 80% 80%þ Maintain above
80%
HMIS reports submitted to district managers on
time and complete
Overall result 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Content of care indicators
% ANC clients receiving two doses of IPT Overall result 80% 80% 80% 80%þ Maintain above
80%
% HIVþ ANC clients on ART Overall result 40% 60% 75% 75%þ Maintain
% of children receiving polio vaccine (OPV0) at birth Overall result 60% 75% 80% 80%þ Maintain
Health managers were rewarded based on the overall performance of facilities in their district/region. Managers also had their own indicators that includes,
maternal and newborn deaths audited properly and timely; reducing stock-out rates of essential drugs; timely reporting the facility data from district to regional
level, and from regional to national level.
Source: The United Republic of Tanzania, Ministry of Health and Social Welfare. 2011. The Coast Region Pay for Performance (P4P) Pilot: Design Document.
85%þ, 85% or more; 80%þ, 80% or more; HMIS, Health Management Information System; ANC, antenatal care.
Figure 1. Conceptual framework for the determinants of performance in pay-for-performance programmes [we modified a conceptual framework which was
initially developed by Rittenhouse et al. (2010) and Markovitz and Ryan (2016)]
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et al., 2010; Eijkenaar, 2013; Fritsche et al., 2014). The distribution-
al effects of P4P schemes will partly depend on how incentives, and
especially targets, are designed. We specifically focus on absolute
and multiple thresholds target since these were used in the
Tanzanian P4P scheme.
Multiple threshold target designs can enhance convergence in per-
formance (Rosenthal et al., 2005; Mehrotra et al., 2010; Eijkenaar,
2013) because they account for baseline performance and provide
incentives for lower performers to catch up. However, absence of sys-
tematic convergence in performance with this design has been
observed in the UK (Sutton et al., 2012). Absolute single threshold/lin-
ear targets can enhance divergence in performance if some providers
are far above and below the target (Heath et al., 1999; Rosenthal and
Dudley, 2007; Mehrotra et al., 2010; Mullen et al., 2010; Miller and
Babiarz, 2013). Improvement is most likely for providers/facilities
that are close to achieve the threshold target. Top performers have no
incentive to improve, and those far below the target may perceive it as
unattainable, a phenomenon referred to as ‘goal-gradient’ theory
(Heath et al., 1999). A single target design fails to account for any
variation in baseline performance (Rosenthal et al., 2005; Mehrotra
et al., 2010; Mullen et al., 2010; Eijkenaar, 2013).
Structural effect
Variation in facility- and area-based factors that are potentially re-
sponsible for inequalities in baseline performance can also affect over-
all facility performance over time (Figure 1) (Markovitz and Ryan,
2016). This is given by @p@x  0. We further assume the change in effort
devoted to affect performance @p@e is increasing in x, that is
@@p@x
@e > 0. If
facilities invest initial bonus payments in enabling factors, this may
improve their future performance, but general predictions of effects
based on variation in structural factors are difficult to make
(Markovitz and Ryan, 2016). We hypothesise that public facilities in
Tanzania are better able to respond to incentives than non-public pro-
viders, as they can offer free MCH services (under the fee exemption
policy) and have more financial autonomy (Mayumana et al., 2017).
However, it is also possible that P4P can level the playing field across
providers of different ownership status (Meessen et al., 2011). We fur-
ther hypothesise that facilities with greater resource availability (e.g.
essential drugs) are better able to increase patient demand than their
counterparts (Donabedian, 1988; Alderman and Lavy, 1996; WHO,
2004); and that dispensaries are less able to respond to incentives
compared with health centres and hospitals since they are more re-
source constrained (MoHSW 2013).
Regarding area-based factors, facilities with wealthier catchment
populations may respond better to incentives, as they can more read-
ily increase service use and revenue through user fees (Castro-Leal
et al., 2000; Victora et al., 2000; Doran et al., 2008; Chien et al.,
2012). Facilities in rural areas may be less able to respond to incen-
tives than their urban counterparts, because of human resource
shortages, poor road infrastructure, and more scattered and disad-
vantaged populations (Munga and Maestad, 2009; Witter et al.,
2013; Fritsche et al., 2014).
Apart from the above hypothesized pathways (incentive design
and structural effect), provider response may also depend on the na-
ture of the services targeted or incentivized. This is because perform-
ance improvement can be harder for some services compared with
other services and this may confound the initial hypothesises of in-
centive design and structural effect. For instance, less efforts are
needed by providers to influence clients’ continuation of care than
initiation of care (Gertler and Vermeersch, 2013).
Materials and methods
Study design and data sources
This study was part of the large impact evaluation of the P4P scheme
in Pwani region (Borghi et al., 2013; Binyaruka et al., 2015). The
P4P evaluation study surveyed all seven districts in Pwani region
(intervention arm), and four districts from Morogoro and Lindi
regions (comparison arm). Comparison districts were selected to be
comparable to intervention districts in terms of poverty and literacy
rates, the rate of institutional deliveries, infant mortality, population
per health facility and the number of children under 1 year of age
per capita (Borghi et al., 2013).
Baseline data at facility and household-levels were collected in
January 2012, with a follow-up round 13 months later. For each study
arm, data on facility ownership (public or non-public facility), level of
Table 2. Baseline facility and area-based characteristics by study arms
Characteristics Description Intervention (n¼ 75) Comparison (n¼ 75) Difference (P-value)
Panel A: facility-based characteristics
Facility ownership ¼1 for public owned (%) 84.0 82.7 1.3 (0.828)
Facility level of care ¼1 for dispensary (%) 70.7 70.7 0.0 (1.000)
Availability of facility utilities ¼1 for electricity and water supply (%) 54.7 52.0 2.7 (0.745)
Availability of drugs—index Mean index (0–1) of 37 drugs [SD] 0.61 [0.16] 0.66 [0.12] –0.05 (0.031)
Availability of drugs—subgroup ¼1 for availability below the median (%) 57.3 42.7 14.6 (0.073)
Baseline coverage level (deliveries) ¼1 for facility below the median (%) 53.3 46.7 6.6 (0.418)
Baseline coverage level (IPT2) ¼1 for facility below the median (%) 54.6 45.3 9.3 (0.256)
Panel B: area-based characteristics
Wealth status index Mean wealth index [SD] –0.43 [1.8] 0.32 [2.4] –0.75 (0.028)
Wealth status—tercile 1 ¼1 for poorest population (%) 40.0 26.7 13.3 (0.084)
Wealth status—tercile 2 ¼1 for middle wealth population (%) 34.7 32.0 2.7 (0.731)
Wealth status—tercile 3 ¼1 for least poor population (%) 25.3 41.3 –16.0 (0.038)
Facility location ¼1 for facility in rural district (%) 78.7 84.0 –5.3 (0.405)
Three quantiles (terciles) were used for wealth status of the facility’s catchment population; Availability of drugs include 37 drugs and analysis used a dummy vari-
able classified based on baseline availability distribution (¼1 for availability below the median/bottom half and 0, otherwise); SD, standard deviation; reference cat-
egory in brackets: public (vs non-public), dispensary (vs health centre and hospital), with electricity and water supply at baseline (vs none), baseline availability of
drugs below the median/in bottom half (vs top half), baseline lower performer/below the median (vs higher performer), rural (vs urban district); for distributional anal-
yses, wealth index and drugs availability index were re-classified on each arm separately and equally to avoid the imbalance across arms at baseline.
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care (hospital, health centre or dispensary), availability of medical
inputs (considered 37 essential drugs) and rural/urban location was
obtained from 75 sampled facilities providing MCH services (6 hospi-
tals, 16 health centres and 53 dispensaries). Data on socioeconomic sta-
tus of the facility catchment populations and service coverage rates were
obtained from households with women who had delivered in the
12 months prior to the baseline and endline surveys. We randomly
sampled 20 eligible households from each facility’s catchment area,
making a total of 1500 households in each arm per survey round.
Facility payout data were obtained from the implementing agency for
all incentivized indicators for the 75 intervention facilities in our sample
over seven payment cycles (2011–14).
Performance outcomes
We considered two facility performance outcomes. First, for each fa-
cility in the intervention arm and for each of seven payment cycles,
we generated a ‘payout score’. That score was constructed as the
bonus payout received divided by the maximum potential payout
(all targets had been met) and multiplied by 100. Payout score was
used to capture for each level of care the relative facility perform-
ance. Second, we estimated facility-level average service coverage
rates for households in the facility catchment area from both study
arms. Our coverage rates were estimated using only two incentivized
services which improved significantly on average due to P4P
(Binyaruka et al., 2015); that is, the coverage of facility-based deliv-
eries and provision of two doses of IPT for malaria during ANC
(referred to as IPT2). We therefore considered only these two service
outcomes to assess whether P4P effect differed across facilities.
Subgroups of facilities for distributional analyses
To examine whether incentive design and structural effects affected per-
formance outcomes, we identified facility subgroups as shown in
Table 2, pertaining to their baseline performance for the two
incentivized indicators (above or below the median); facility characteris-
tics (ownership, level of care, availability of utilities, rural-urban loca-
tion); an un-weighted index of drug availability at baseline
(Supplementary Appendix Table S1); and wealth status of the catch-
ment population, based on mean wealth index scores across households
in the facility-catchment area generated by principal component analysis
(Vyas and Kumaranayake, 2006) (Supplementary Appendix Table S2).
Analysis
We first compared the sample means at baseline for each of the facil-
ity subgroups across study arms, and examined eventual differences
between study arms using the t-test.
Distribution of bonus payouts
To assess how bonus payouts were distributed across intervention
facilities, we used three measures of inequality: an absolute measure
(the gap) and two relative measures [the ratio and the concentration
index (CI)] (O’Donnell et al., 2008; WHO, 2013). The gap was
measured as the difference in payout scores between facility sub-
groups. The ratio was measured as the ratio of payout scores be-
tween subgroups. In relation to wealth subgroups, a positive
(negative) gap and a ratio greater (less) than one defines a pro-rich
(pro-poor) distribution, respectively. A gap of zero and a ratio of
one defines an equal distribution. We tested whether the gaps were
significantly different from zero by using t-tests.
The CI was computed on a ranking variable of area-based wealth
status to examine wealth-related inequality in the distribution of
payouts (Kakwani et al., 1997; O’Donnell et al., 2008). The CI
ranges between [1 and þ1], whereby zero indicate equality be-
tween wealth subgroups, while negative and positive values indicate
that payouts are pro-poor and pro-rich, respectively. We tested
whether the CIs were significantly different from zero.
Heterogeneity in service coverage outcomes
We measured the difference in mean baseline coverage of the two
incentivized services between facility subgroups (the coverage gap;
WHO, 2013) and tested for significant differences between subgroups.
Based on the two incentivized services that were improved by
P4P (i.e. facility-based deliveries by 8.2% points, and provision of
IPT2 by 10.3% points) (Binyaruka et al., 2015), we assessed
whether the effects differed by facility subgroup. We used a linear
difference-in-differences regression model with a three-way inter-
action term between the average treatment effect (P4Pi  dt) and fa-
cility subgrouping variable Gi. The associated two-order interaction
terms were also included in the model as shown in Equation (1).
Yit ¼ b0 þ b1ðP4Pi  dtÞ þ b2dt þ b3Zit þ b4ðP4Pi  dt GiÞ
þ b5ðGi  dtÞ þ ci þ eit (1)
where Yit is the service coverage outcome of facility i at time t. P4Pi
is a dummy variable, taking the value 1 if a facility is exposed to P4P
and zero otherwise. We controlled for unobserved time-invariant fa-
cility-level characteristics ci with facility fixed-effects estimation,
and included dt for year fixed-effects. We also controlled for time-
varying facility-level covariates Zit (availability of electricity and
water supply, and the mean wealth index for households sampled in
the catchment area of the facility) as potential confounding factors.
The error term is eit. Our statistical inference for regression was
based on standard errors clustered at the facility level to account for
serial correlation of eit at the facility level. The coefficient of interest
for the differential effect across facility subgroups is b4.
Causal inference using the difference-in-differences approach relies
on the key identifying assumption that the trends in outcomes would
have been parallel across study arms in the absence of the intervention
(Khandker et al., 2010). While this cannot be formally tested, we justi-
fied the assumption by verifying that the pre-intervention trends were
parallel in Tanzania (Binyaruka et al., 2015; Anselmi et al., 2017). This
was verified in women who had delivered in the past 12 months at base-
line for the following outcomes for which we had monthly data: share
of institutional deliveries, caesarean section deliveries, women who
breastfeed within 1 h of birth, and women who paid for delivery care.
We also verified pre-intervention trends to be parallel in facility service
utilization levels based on patient registers.
We performed some robustness checks. First, we re-estimated
the model for facility-based deliveries excluding hospitals (8% of
facilities per arm), as hospitals have less clearly defined catchment
populations. Second, we clustered the standard errors at the district
level and used a bootstrapping method to adjust the small number
of district-clusters (Cameron and Miller, 2015). Third, we reclassi-
fied the mean wealth scores into two quantiles (below or above the
median) to check whether the wealth effect was sensitive to classifi-
cation of the wealth groupings. Lastly, apart from using a conven-
tional parametric test (a t-test) to assess whether differences in
payouts between subgroups were significant, a non-parametric test
(Wilcoxon rank-sum test) was also used (Kitchen, 2009). All the
analyses were performed using STATA version 13.
Results
Facility and area-based characteristics were generally similar in the
intervention and comparison arms at baseline (Table 2), although
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intervention facilities served poorer populations, and had marginally
lower availability of drugs than comparison facilities.
Distribution of bonus payouts
There was an increase in average payout scores between payment
cycle 1 (50.1% of total potential payout) and cycle 7 (77.7%)
(Table 3), and the payouts were highest for facilities with least poor
catchment populations. This pro-rich effect was confirmed by posi-
tive equity gaps and concentration indices, and an equity ratio that
was greater than one across all payment cycles (Table 3, Columns
5–7). The inequalities were generally stronger in early compared
with later cycles (Table 3).
Facilities with greater availability of drugs at baseline, hospitals and
health centres had significantly higher payout scores than facilities with
Table 3. Distribution of facility payout scores by wealth status of the catchment populations
Payment cycle All Area-based wealth status (terciles) Equity CI (P-value)
Mean [SD] Least poor Middle Poorest Gap (P-value) Ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
CYCLE 1 (%) 50.1 [19.4] 54.7 52.3 43.1 11.6 (0.027) 1.27 0.042 (0.099)
CYCLE 2 (%) 50.3 [19.1] 58.4 49.7 42.4 16.0 (0.002) 1.38 0.088 (0.000)
CYCLE 3 (%) 64.6 [18.8] 69.2 65.1 59.6 9.6 (0.062) 1.16 0.036 (0.054)
CYCLE 4 (%) 67.5 [19.5] 67.8 69.6 65.1 2.7 (0.623) 1.04 0.007 (0.699)
CYCLE 5 (%) 74.5 [18.5] 75.3 74.9 73.4 1.9 (0.707) 1.03 0.007 (0.669)
CYCLE 6 (%) 69.6 [20.1] 72.0 75.3 61.3 10.7 (0.046) 1.17 0.035 (0.058)
CYCLE 7 (%) 77.7 [16.3] 79.2 76.9 76.9 2.3 (0.619) 1.03 0.006 (0.672)
Pooled—all cycles (1–7) (%) 64.7 [11.7] 68.1 66.3 60.5 7.6 (0.015) 1.13 0.027 (0.022)
Analysis restricted to intervention facilities only (n¼ 75); p-values in Column (5) were from t-test of the null hypothesis that the gap [Columns (2)–(4)] is equal
to zero; p-values in Column (7) were for testing the null hypothesis of zero CI; SD, standard deviation; terciles for wealth status were generated with equal-size
from intervention arm separately; Gap, least poor—poorest; ratio, least poor/poorest; the results were generally similar in Column (5) when non-parametric test
(Wilcoxon rank-sum) is used (Supplementary Table S6).
Table 4. Distribution of facility payout scores by other subgroups of facilities
Facility subgroups By payment cycle Pooled average cycles
Cycle 1 Cycle 2 Cycle 3 Cycle 4 Cycle 5 Cycle 6 Cycle 7 Cycles 1–7
Facility location
Rural (%) 52.2 48.5 66.3 69.5 76.4 71.3 80.0 66.4
Urban (%) 42.3 56.7 58.3 60.1 68.1 63.2 68.9 59.7
Gap (%) 9.9** –8.2* 8.0 9.4* 8.3 8.1 11.1** 6.7*
Ratio 1.2 0.9 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.1
Ownership status
Public owned (%) 49.9 49.5 66.0 68.8 75.8 70.0 78.4 65.6
Non-public (%) 50.9 54.4 56.9 60.6 66.7 67.1 73.6 61.5
Gap (%) –1.0 –4.9 9.1 8.2 9.1 2.9 4.8 4.1
Ratio 1.0 0.9 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.1
Level of care
Dispensary (%) 47.7 46.9 60.2 63.5 71.5 66.9 75.4 61.9
HC and hospital (%) 55.8 58.3 75.3 77.0 81.7 75.8 82.9 72.4
Gap (%) 8.1* 11.4** 15.1*** 13.5*** 10.2*** 8.9** 7.5** 10.5***
Ratio 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9
Electricity and water supply
Available (%) 53.6 51.9 66.7 69.1 76.8 71.3 81.1 67.2
None (%) 45.9 48.3 62.1 65.5 71.7 67.5 73.5 62.2
Gap (%) 7.7* 3.6 4.6 3.6 5.1 3.8 7.6** 5.0*
Ratio 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1
Availability of drugs
Above the median (%) 50.6 58.6 68.3 72.2 76.0 74.6 79.3 68.5
Below the median (%) 49.7 41.8 61.0 62.9 73.2 64.6 76.0 61.5
Gap (%) 0.9 16.8*** 7.3* 9.3** 2.8 10.0** 3.3 7.0***
Ratio 1.0 1.4 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.2 1.0 1.1
Analysis restricted to intervention facilities only (n¼75); Gap is the difference in payout score between two subgroups of facilities; ratio is the ratio of payout
scores for two subgroups; the significance test was by t-test for the null hypothesis of gap equals zero; the results were generally similar when non-parametric test
(Wilcoxon rank-sum) was used to test the significant of the gap (results not shown).
*Significance at 10% level.
**Significance at 5% level.
***Significance at 1% level.
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more limited drug availability and dispensaries (Table 4). The equity
ratios were1, near equality, between most subgroups (Table 4).
Heterogeneity in service coverage outcomes
Baseline facility-based delivery rates and coverage of IPT2 during
ANC were similar between most facility subgroups (Table 5).
Exceptions were higher facility-based delivery rates in facilities with
the least poor catchment populations, and higher coverage of IPT2
among the poorest catchment populations. Coverage of IPT2 was
higher among dispensaries than health centres and hospitals, but
there were lower levels of coverage in both outcomes in the compari-
son arm at baseline (Table 5).
P4P resulted in a greater increase in facility-based deliveries among
facilities with lower baseline coverage levels than those with higher
baseline coverage levels (by 13.0% points, P¼0.006) (Table 6), and
among facilities serving middle wealth populations than those serving
least poor populations (by 14.3% points, P¼0.004) (Table 6). P4P
also resulted in a greater increase in facility-based deliveries among
facilities in rural compared with urban districts (by 10.0% points,
P¼0.030). The effect of P4P on coverage of IPT2 increased over time
and was similar across all facility subgroups (Table 6).
The results on facility-based deliveries were similar when we
restricted the analysis to primary care facilities, except for the differ-
ence between rural/urban locations that became insignificant
(Supplementary Table S3). The results were generally robust to clus-
tering at the district level, except that there was no longer a differen-
tial effect on deliveries by wealth subgroups (Supplementary Table
S4). When two quantiles of wealth scores (lower and higher) were
used, the differential effect for facility-based deliveries became insig-
nificant (Supplementary Table S5). The use of non-parametric tests
of differences between payouts across facilities revealed similar
results to those using parametric tests (Supplementary Table S6).
Discussion
We examined the distribution of P4P payouts over time and assessed
how P4P effects on service coverage differed across facility sub-
groups in Tanzania. We then assessed whether facility performance
was shaped by the incentive design and/or facility and area-based
characteristics. This study is one of the few that examine how P4P
payouts are distributed and that examine broadly whether there was
supply-side heterogeneous P4P effects due to incentive design or
structural factors in a LMIC. We found some evidence of both in-
centive design effects, and effects from structural differences at base-
line on performance inequalities. However, the inequalities in
payouts distribution declined over time.
Our finding of reduced inequalities in payouts distribution (con-
vergence in performance) by population wealth status over time is
partly consistent with the ‘inverse equity hypothesis’ (Victora et al.,
2000). The hypothesis suggests that better-off groups will initially
benefit from a new intervention, widening inequalities, but over
time the worse-off will catch up especially when the better-off have
extracted maximum benefit. This convergence in payouts over time
is also consistent with US evidence that wealthier hospitals initially
received higher payouts than their counterparts, but the distribution
Table 5. Baseline coverage levels by facility subgroups across study arms
Outcome variable/subgrouping variable Intervention arm (n¼ 75) Comparison arm (n¼ 75)
Yes No Gap Yes No Gap
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OUTCOME 1: institutional/facility-based deliveries
Public facility (%) 84.6 84.7 –0.1 86.4 89.0 –2.6
Dispensary facility (%) 82.5 89.5 –7.0 85.3 90.7 –5.4**
Facility with utilities (electricity and water supply) (%) 86.9 81.7 5.2 88.3 85.4 2.9
Facility with drugs availability below the median (%) 83.9 85.2 –1.3 88.6 85.1 3.5
Facility with poorest catchment population (%) 84.6 89.7 –5.1* 81.5 92.7 –11.2***
Facility with middle wealth catchment population (%) 79.5 89.7 –10.2** 86.3 92.7 –6.4**
Facility in rural district (%) 83.9 87.1 –3.2 85.9 92.0 –6.1*
Lower performer (below the median) (%) 73.9 95.6 –21.7*** 80.4 95.9 –15.5***
OUTCOME 2: provision of IPT2 to ANC clients
Public facility (%) 50.2 50.6 –0.4 57.0 51.3 5.7
Dispensary facility (%) 53.8 41.7 12.1*** 54.1 60.5 –6.4*
Facility with utilities (electricity and water supply) (%) 47.7 53.2 –5.5 57.8 54.1 3.7
Facility with drugs availability below the median (%) 53.6 46.7 6.9* 57.2 54.7 2.5
Facility with poorest catchment population (%) 49.5 45.7 3.8 61.6 52.5 9.1**
Facility with middle wealth catchment population (%) 55.5 45.7 9.8** 53.8 52.5 1.3
Facility in rural district (%) 50.8 47.9 2.9 56.1 55.3 0.8
Lower performer (below the median) (%) 37.3 63.5 –26.2*** 44.0 68.9 –24.9***
We used a t-test to test the null hypothesis of a gap (Columns 3 and 6) equals to zero; Terciles classified in each arm separately were used for wealth status of
the facility’s catchment population; availability of drugs included 37 essential drugs and analysis used a dummy variable classified in each arm separately based on
baseline availability distribution (¼1 for availability below the median/bottom half and 0, otherwise); reference category for ‘NO’ column in brackets: public (vs
non-public), dispensary (vs health centre and hospital), with electricity and water supply at baseline (vs none), baseline availability of drugs below the median/in
bottom half (vs top half), baseline lower performer/below the median (vs higher performer); similar pattern of results when hospitals are excluded for facility-
based delivery outcome; overall baseline coverage in facility-based deliveries was (84.7 and 86.8%) and IPT2 coverage was (49.5 and 56.7%) for intervention and
control arm, respectively (Binyaruka et al., 2015).
*Significance at 10% level.
**Significance 5% level.
***Significance at 1% level.
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of payouts levelled over time (Ryan et al., 2012). The reduced pay-
out inequalities in the US was partly due a change in the incentive
design from only rewarding top performers to rewarding any im-
provement where all providers were likely to receive a payout (Ryan
et al., 2012).
The finding that P4P had greatest effect on facility-based deliv-
eries (with multiple threshold targets) among baseline lower per-
formers indicates convergence in performance and is consistent with
evidence on quality improvements from the UK (Doran et al., 2008),
Canada (Li et al., 2014) and the US (Rosenthal et al., 2005;
Lindenauer et al., 2007; Blustein et al., 2010; Chen et al., 2010; Jha
et al., 2012). In Rwanda, however, a P4P programme rewards on a
fee-for-service system and several rewarded services improved most
among facilities with middle baseline quality scores (Sherry et al.,
2017). The convergence in performance in HICs was partly linked
to a design with multiple threshold targets in the UK (Doran et al.,
2008) and Canada (Li et al., 2014) and to a US design system (rela-
tive incentive design) that rewarded the highest performers and
penalized the lowest performers (Rosenthal et al., 2005; Lindenauer
et al., 2007). However, another study in the UK of a hospital incen-
tive scheme with multiple thresholds found evidence of divergence
in performance in relation to mortality outcomes linked to pneumo-
nia but not for other conditions (Sutton et al., 2012).
Our finding that the effects of P4P on facility-based deliveries
differed according to the wealth status of facility catchment
populations is somewhat different to that reported in the UK and
the US with respect to quality of care improvements (Doran et al.,
2008; Gravelle et al., 2008; Alshamsan et al., 2010; Blustein et al.,
2010; Chien et al., 2012; Kontopantelis et al., 2013). While these
studies found that providers serving low-income populations per-
formed initially less well but improved most over time, we found
that facilities serving middle wealth populations with initial low
coverage improved more over time than those with least poor popu-
lations. Moreover, while we found that the effect of P4P on coverage
of institutional deliveries was greater for rural facilities in Tanzania,
a US study found no association between performance on quality
and rural/urban location (Ryan and Blustein, 2011); and studies in
the UK showed that P4P had less effect in rural than in urban areas
(Gravelle et al., 2008; Kontopantelis et al., 2013).
We found similar improvements on IPT2 coverage across facili-
ties (no differential effect of P4P), which is in contrast to literature
that suggests a design with a single threshold target, as used for
IPT2, fails to account for baseline performance and can enhance di-
vergence in performance (Heath et al., 1999; Rosenthal et al., 2005;
Rosenthal and Dudley, 2007; Mehrotra et al., 2010; Mullen et al.,
2010; Eijkenaar, 2013). Our finding might be explained by the al-
most universal coverage of one ANC visit in Tanzania (Binyaruka
et al., 2015; TDHS, 2016), and the nature of the targeted service
(content of care, rather than service use) may have meant that min-
imal effort was needed for providers to achieve the target for IPT2.
Table 6. Heterogeneity in the effect of P4P on service coverage outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Outcome 1: facility-based delivery
P4P effect 4.0 5.7 9.2*** 4.4 1.0 1.4 –0.8
P4P effectpublic facility 4.4
P4P effectdispensary facility 2.7
P4P effectwith available utilities –2.9
P4P effectlow availability of drugs 6.3
P4P effectlower baseline performer 13.0***
P4P effectpoorest population 4.0
P4P effectmiddle wealth population 14.3***
P4P effectrural facilities 10.0**
Control mean at baseline 86.8 86.6 86.8 86.4 86.5 86.5 86.8
Observation (n) 300 300 300 300 300 300 300
Outcome 2: IPT2 coverage
P4P effect 5.4 15.9*** 9.4* 10.2** 5.8* 9.2* 4.8
P4P effectpublic facility 4.5
P4P effectdispensary facility –9.6
P4P effectwith available utilities –0.2
P4P effectlow availability of drugs –1.8
P4P effectlower baseline performer 7.5
P4P effectpoorest population 6.4
P4P effectmiddle wealth population –6.4
P4P effectrural facilities 5.2
Control mean at baseline 51.4 51.2 51.6 51.6 51.4 51.9 51.7
Observation (n) 300 300 300 300 300 300 300
All regressions are ordinary least square (OLS). All specifications leads to an estimated Beta showing percentage point after controlling for a year dummy, facil-
ity-fixed effects and facility-level covariates (availability of utilities and wealth status of the catchment population); availability of drugs include 37 drugs and ana-
lysis used a dummy variable classified in each arm separately based on baseline availability distribution (¼1 for availability below the median/bottom half and 0,
otherwise); reference category in brackets: public (vs non-public), dispensary (vs health centre and hospital), with electricity and water supply at baseline (vs
none), baseline availability of drugs below the median/in bottom half (vs top half), baseline lower performer/below the median (vs higher performer), rural (vs
urban district), poorest/middle wealth (vs least poor).
*Significance at 10% level.
**Significance 5% level.
***Significance at 1% level.
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Our results lend support to the notion that the incentive design,
facility characteristics and the nature of services being targeted
themselves, will determine how providers respond to P4P, their abil-
ity to achieve targets and receive P4P payouts, and the extent to
which P4P leads to convergence in performance across providers.
Although P4P is typically talked about as a single or uniform inter-
vention, there is in fact substantial variation in incentive structures
and scheme designs (Eijkenaar, 2013; Miller and Babiarz, 2013).
Our study suggests that design details may be important for deter-
mining the distributional effects of P4P across providers, and
whether P4P will enhance or reduce existing performance inequal-
ities (Rosenthal et al., 2005; Rosenthal and Frank, 2006; Rosenthal
and Dudley, 2007; Ryan et al., 2012). Further research is needed to
examine the effects of incentive design on outcomes, and researchers
should be encouraged to report on programme design aspects in
their evaluations of P4P and systematically monitor and report sub-
group effects across providers.
In addition to consideration of incentive design, a number of pol-
icies could be introduced to tackle structural factors to increase the
likelihood of reducing performance inequalities with the introduc-
tion of P4P. ‘Equity bonuses’ have been suggested as a means to en-
hance performance among disadvantaged facilities so they benefit
from payouts from the start (Rosenthal and Dudley, 2007; Meessen
et al., 2011; Fritsche et al., 2014). Facility readiness assessment stud-
ies and potential quality boosting investments are also important to
harmonise the capacity to deliver services prior to P4P. These are
standard practices for most P4P programmes funded by the World
Bank in LMICs, and the national P4P rollout programme in
Tanzania has similarly incorporated these practices.
This study has a number of limitations. First, the administrative
data on payouts did not allow for a disaggregation of payouts by
service indicator, and thus we used the total payout per cycle which
reflects performance across all P4P indicators. Second, since infor-
mation about payout distribution was limited to intervention facili-
ties, our results represent associations rather than causal effects.
Third, we used household data from a random sample of 20 house-
holds per facility to proxy service coverage at facility level and
wealth status of the facility’s catchment population, and these may
have not been representative of the entire catchment populations
surrounding facilities. Furthermore, our analysis assumed that
households in a facility’s catchment population would have used the
facility for care seeking, whereas it is possible that households
bypassed their nearest provider to seek care at higher level or more
distant facilities. Fourth, the finding of the convergence in coverage
of institutional deliveries over 13 months may reflect a regression to
the mean principle (a random fluctuation rather than a true causal
effect) due to a ‘shorter term’ assessment (Barnett et al., 2005), al-
though the distribution in terms of payouts over the ‘longer term’ of
seven payment cycles showed a consistent pattern on convergence.
Fifth, as our two service coverage outcomes differed both in terms of
incentive design as well as the nature of the service being targeted, it
was not possible to determine the extent to which the difference in
provider performance response was due to the former or the latter.
Finally, because of sample size constraints, we examined differential
effects across facility subgroups using a three-way interaction term,
and were unable to run separate models for each subgroup (sub-
group effects) and compare their effects for better understanding of
programme effect. We also classified baseline performance into two
subgroups rather than five subgroups as used in the design, due to
insufficient sample size. As a result, it was not possible to determine
what effect the ‘maintain coverage’ target had on performance rela-
tive to the ‘improve coverage’ target.
Conclusion
In this study, better-off facilities (hospitals, health centres, facilities
with more medical commodities and serving wealthier populations)
benefited more from P4P payouts than worse-off facilities in the
short term; but these inequalities declined over time as worse-off
facilities caught up. The increased coverage of facility-based deliv-
eries was greater among facilities with lower levels of baseline cover-
age, with middle wealth catchment populations, and located in rural
areas; whereas the increased IPT2 coverage was similar across facil-
ity subgroups. The design of incentives and a range of facility char-
acteristics seem to have influenced performance inequalities;
however, the nature of the service being targeted is also likely to
have affected provider response. While P4P can help to improve ser-
vice coverage and quality, and to reduce performance inequalities,
care must be taken to ensure that P4P design does not disproportion-
ally benefit those who are already better-off.
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